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ABSTRACT1
The aim of this article is to investigate whether the Italian University grants are an ef-
fective tool to prevent student drop-out and to favor the degree attainment, both for
merit and need-based financial aids. The survey units are Italian students enrolled on a
degree course in Chemistry, Physics and Mathematics from 2002/03 until 2007/08 in the
University of Trieste. On the one hand, the Regional Agency for the Right to Education
offers some grants every year to eligible students from low-income families (rarely related
to merit). On the other hand, Fonda Foundation offers some (only) merit-based grants
to the best students enrolled in Chemistry, Physics and Mathematics degree courses. In
order to estimate the causal effect of receiving a grant, we follow the counterfactual analy-
sis and we match treated and control units using Genetic matching and Coarsened Exact
Matching. The results suggest that the income-based financial aids have a positive impact
to prevent drop-out at 2nd year, but a non significant effect on graduation time, whereas
the merit-based scholarships increase the probability to achieve the degree in the time
alloted.
1Corresponding author: Grazia Graziosi, DEAMS ‘Bruno de Finetti’, Universita` degli Studi di
Trieste , piazzale Europa 1, Trieste
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1. Introduction
In a context of decreasing of higher education funds and the difficulties of education
systems in obtaining the necessary resources to ensure high quality levels, there is a need
to introduce a culture of evaluation of public policies that suggest which actions to take
for improving the effectiveness of resources.
In Italy, public funding for tertiary education sees the predominance of income-based
grants as the main type of intervention for “capable and deserving students, even those
without adequate economic resources.”2
The main objective of this public policy is to encourage investment in tertiary educa-
tion for students from low income families and to reduce socioeconomic inequalities.
From this point of view, the income-based scholarships seems to respond to the exten-
sive concept of equal opportunity: “having an equal opportunity necessitates there being
on equal starting position; this means also starting from an equal financial position or at
least from one which is not disadvantageous” (Sartori, 1987).
Contrary to the expectations, the social inequalities are noticeable in the rates of
completion of tertiary education, both in the Italian and European systems (M. and
Checchi, 2008) and (EQUNET, 2010).
A wide-ranging policy discussion focuses on merit incentives. The main criticism of
this approach regards the fact that the best students, on average, come from better socio-
economic backgrounds, which plays a crucial role in choosing higher education.
However, the higher returns of human capital investment occur when they are carried
out in early childhood and pre-school age, particularly for low-background pupils, because
these early interventions yield more fertile ground for enhancing future learning (Carneiro
and Heckman, 2003), (Cunha et al., 2006).
Afterwards, overcoming the initial gap allows students to remove those obstacles de-
pendent on external factors and influencing the education choices.
According to this procedure, the equality of opportunity is guaranteed for “the for-
mation of a career based on talent and solely talent due to one’s capacities and merits”
(Sartori, 1987).
A good theoretical argument which support this thesis can be found in Walzer (1983).
The Italian political attention towards the merit criterion is recent: the Law of 30
December 2010 no. 240 establishes a merit-fund with the aim of both awarding funds to
the best students and lending them their part of the higher education expenditures, to be
reimbursed at the end of their studies, in proportion to their future income.
Regarding the effects of Italian university grants, little attention has been paid. The
aim of this research is to contribute using an empirical analysis on the causal effects of
the scholarships both on the probability of enrolling in the 2nd year and to completing
the degree in the time alloted.
The peculiarity of this analysis resides in the evaluation of incentives that differ from
student’s requirement: based mainly on family-income or solely on merit.
2Art. 34, c. 2, Constitution of Italian Republic.
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2. Background literature
There is a growing body of international literature that examines the effects of student
financial aid on student enrollment and graduation; however the majority examines all
forms of aid without distinguishing their nature and mixing different types of financial
aids: scholarships, grants, loans and tax concessions, based on income and merit criteria
at the same time.
The incentives examined here are those of which the selection criteria rest on very
different bases (Bresciani and Carson, 2002), (Gladieux and Perna, 2005)(Gladieux and
Perna, 2005), while there are few studies that examine separately the effects of the income
related incentives and those for merit (Cornwell et al., 2005),(Scott-Clayton, 2011) and
even fewer studies that compare the results (Singell and Stater, 2006).
In any case, researchers must grapple with the difficulties that are encountered in
identifying the causal effect of economic incentives. First of all, both the methodology
and the empirical research estimate the average effects on the entire population, failing
to consider the potential different effects on different sub-populations. Therefore, the cor-
rectness of measuring the causal effects of economic incentives by comparing the academic
careers of students who diverge strongly from each other, not only with respect to the
grants awarded, is doubtful.
Moreover, in spite of the political actors being interested in the long-term causal
effects, such as obtaining a qualification, most of the research focuses on the short-term
effects, such as registrations and drop-outs in the second year.
For estimating the causal effect of receiving an incentive, most research focus on
projects that randomly assign some form of benefits to improve academic performance.
Angrist et al. (2009) assess the Project STAR3 took place at one of the larger Canadian
university. All first-year students4 enrolling in September 2005 were randomly assigned to
one of the three treatment groups or a control groups. One treatment group was offered
financial incentives for good grades. Another was guaranteed academic support services.
A third group mixed both interventions. As the consequence, service use was highest for
women and for students in the combined group. The mixed treatment also raised their
grades and improved the academic standing of women. These differentials persisted until
the end of second year, though incentives were given in the first year only. This suggests
study skills among some treated women increased. Opposite, the program had no effect
on men.
The estimate of the causal effect of incentives on the results achieved by the students
is not so easy to determine. Even if the scholarships are assigned randomly, the students
who participate and success in the program have, from the start, some characteristics
which make them different from other students.
For example, Witte (2000) modeled the probability of adherence to the Milwaukee
Program5 depending on the factors of eligibility and a number of other demographic
3Student Achievement and Retention Project.
4Except the students with the higher school grade point average (GPA).
5The Milwaukee Program awards grants to students who attend private schools and who, without
the voucher, could not afford to do so. Sometimes this voucher is assigned randomly to volunteers
participating in the program
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characteristics such as the race of the students, the household income, gender, and the
level of the mother’s education. He came to the conclusion that African-American and
Hispanic students participate more, and especially the girls, and the probability to take
part in the program is higher in those families where the level of education of the mother
is higher.
The set of socio-demographic characteristics that influence the probability of partici-
pating reflects the socio-cultural context in which the program is carried out and creates a
distortion in the two groups of participants and non-participants, which are heterogeneous
with respect to characteristics that affect the variable result (Heckman, 1996).
A further problem concerns those students who receive a contribution linked to in-
come. On average, they come from a background which is culturally and socially more
disadvantaged and this, even with an incentive, may affect the way the university life
develops and a relevant initial effort could be required. In this perspective, it is difficult
to separate the likely benefits of the scholarships from the academic results. A simple
correlation between income related incentives and school career may underestimate the
real benefit and it is probable that characteristics which are important, but also difficult
to measure, may be omitted (Dynarski, 2003; Riegg, 2008).
This is the reason why studies of the observational type often suffer from selection
bias, which results in an estimate of the effects which is not accurate.
The omission of variables which affect the response is a common problem in this type
of analysis, and it derives both from the unavailability of data as well as from the nature
of the analysis techniques. However, the assumption that the provision of more incentives
is positively correlated with the rate of enrollment and of graduation is generally accepted
and justified by empirical research. As for what is meant, then, by result of incentives,
we can distinguish three aspects: registrations, subsequent years enrollments and the
completion of studies.
Researches based on U.S. data, both national and federal, show how reducing the direct
costs of education has a positive and statistically significant impact on registrations. For
example Kane (2001) estimates that an increase of 1, 000$ in income related incentives to
the is associated with an increase in the number of enrolments by 6 percentage points.
Among the few researchers that consider the obtainment of the degree, Dynarski (2005)
estimates that the scholarships awarded by the program HOPE6 in the states of Arkansas
and Georgia have increased the number of graduates in these two states.
An interesting national study in Italy that deals with the effects of national policies
for the support of university studies was conducted by the IRPET (Regional Institute for
Economic Planning of Tuscany) on behalf of the National Committee for the Evaluation
of the University System (CNVSU), and aims to measure the impact of scholarships on
the career of the students(Mealli and Rampichini, 2006, 2012). The analysis focuses on
11 universities evenly distributed throughout the country and considers students enrolled
for the academic years 1998/99, 1999/2000 and 2001/02.
The two dimensions of the educational process investigated, persistence (enrollment
in the second year) and productivity (exams taken in the second year), have been studied
by analyzing each university separately. The effectiveness of the grant in relation to the
6Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally.
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probability of enrollment in the second year is demonstrated in 9 of the 11 universities
considered only for non-resident students, while it is almost never effective for commuters
and resident students. In the second year, and with respect to the completion of the
exams, the grant shows greater efficacy, albeit limited to those students who qualify for
the first time, and almost never shows a cumulative effect. In general, therefore, the
scholarships do not always reduce first-year dropout rates and do not always favor, in the
second year, the passing of the exams (Mealli and Rampichini, 2006).
Furthermore, Mealli and Rampichini (2012) show how that the effect of the grant on
the continuation of studies decreases with a decrease of the income, that is to say that
for the poorest students winning the grant does not affect the decision to abandon the
university. The authors justify this result by attributing it to the amount of the scholarship
being limited, and to the fact that, even if it is accompanied by the exemption from the
payment of tuition fees, it is not sufficient to cover the maintenance costs of students
concerned.
This consideration agrees with the conclusions drawn by Garibaldi et al. (2007) about
the effects of grants on the completion of students studies within the set timeframe. From
their analysis it appears that if the economic incentives were increased by 1 000 euros,
the probability that the students7 would obtain their degree beyond the duration of the
studies would decrease by 5.2%
A randomized experiment was conducted by De Paola et al. (2012) at the University of
Calabria involving 462 students enrolled at the first year of the degree course in Business
and Administration in the academic year 2008/09. Students participating at the exper-
iment were assigned to three different groups: two treated groups (one top award group
and one modest reward group) and the control group. Bonus were assigned to the 30 best
performing students in each treated group. Findings indicate that financial rewards inten-
sify student performance both in terms of credits collected and grades earned at exams.
High ability students react strongly while the effect is null for low ability students.
Finally, Covizzi et al. (2010) estimate the effect of a program of scholarships to deserv-
ing students from poor families in relation to the probability of enrollment at University
of Trento. Preliminary results show that the effect is not statistically significant on the
enrollment rates of the group of beneficiary students.
3. Sample selection
The dataset consists of 777 units which represent the individual data of the Italian
students enrolled in an undergraduate program in chemistry, physics and mathematics
from the academic year 2002/03 to the academic year 2007/08 (see figure 1), whose main
identification element is the tax identification number of the student. This first datum is
associated with the identification information provided by the University of Trieste and,
among these, the following are of interest: age, sex, grade and year of graduation, city of
residence, year of registration and the course of study.
As far as the income data are concerned, unfortunately, the University of Trieste does
not request information on the financial position of the students when they are enrolling
7The sample is that of students at the Bocconi University.
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or registering. This information is provided voluntarily by the student if he/she might
be entitled to an adjustment in the payment of tuition fees based on his/her household
income. In this case, the Secretariat assigns the student to an income range. Where the
information is not present, the field is left blank and the student not having the right to
a recalculation of the share of fees to pay, pays the higher amount.
Regarding the incentives granted, the archives of two funding institutions were ac-
quired: the Regional Agency for the Right to Education and the Fonda College. The first
contains the data of the students applying for an income related grant, the outcome of
the application and the Iseeu declaration.8.
The data about the scholarships awarded by the Fonda College on the basis of merit
contain all the information about the candidates who are eligible and winners of scholar-
ships, and the scores of the students who took part in the selection are shown. See the
next section for a description of the selection process of the grants.
All the calculations were made with the statistical package R (R Development Core
Team, 2011).
a. Treatments and outcomes
The objective is to estimate the effect of winning a scholarship, which is the subject of
the treatment, compared with two response variables: enrollment in the second year and
the achievement of a three-year degree within the three years envisaged by academics as
the necessary duration of the degree concerned.
The following two variables were chosen, as they summarize the two phenomena of
interest: the drop-out and completion of the studies. In fact it was observed in the
exploratory analysis, that the drop-out in the second and subsequent years is a limited
phenomenon (see figure 3), therefore the enrollment in the second year can be considered
an indicator of effective completion of the course. On the other hand the graduation
within the time foreseen for the course is an indicator of the quality of the path followed.
In this context, two different types of scholarships are chosen, which represent two
different treatments.
The first regards the grant by the Regional Agency for the Right to Education, which
is awarded in the first year of registration solely on the basis of income, and in subsequent
years on the basis of income and merit.
Students who enroll in the first year of the course may, on a voluntary basis and
presenting the Iseeu statement, obtain a scholarship varying from 1, 706 to 4, 524 euros
(reference year 2008) depending on whether the student is resident, commuter or non-
resident, and on the correspondence of the Iseeu indicator with the income thresholds set
out in the grant conditions.
Without prejudice to the income requirement, students in the undergraduate courses
who are winners of the scholarship must obtain, by the middle of August, 25 credits to
enroll in the second year and 80 credits to access the third year, in order to maintain their
entitlement to the scholarship.
The second treatment instead is winning the scholarship allocated by the “Luciano
8This is the recalculation of the Indicator of equivalent economic situation that considers, in addition
to the family assets, also any income of the siblings who make up the household
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Fonda” University College for Sciences to students who enroll in courses in chemistry,
physics and mathematics. The scholarships are awarded to students who have completed
secondary school in the previous year and who wish to get a degree in chemistry, physics
and mathematics.
An invitation is published each academic year and the applications must reach the
Secretariat of the Board by the end of August. Neither the high school diploma marks
nor the income of the applicant are considered for the admission to the selection. Students
who pass the written selection with at least 70/100 are called for an interview, after which
a merit list is drawn up. The winners are announced on the basis of the position in the
final ranking, the score obtained in the selection and number of scholarships allocated by
the Board. This implies that, depending on the academic year considered, the same score
may be either sufficient or insufficient to obtain the scholarship.
The number of scholarships varies depending on the academic year. In the first year
of observation 15 grants were allocated, in the academic years 2003/2004 and 2004/05 14
scholarships were awarded, and 17 were awarded in the following years. The amount of
the scholarship increased from 5, 165 euros to 5, 200 euros. The winning students must,
by August 31st, have passed all the exams included in the curriculum for the year with
an average of at least 27/30.
The two treatments differ therefore for what is required from the students: in the first
case the scholarship is awarded exclusively on an income criterion for the first year, while
for the subsequent years a not so strict merit criterion also applies. In the second case,
merit is the only criterion to obtain the scholarship, either for the first and the following
years.
4. Empirical strategy
Attributing the changed observed to a causal effect of a policy consists in identifying
the net contribution that this intervention has made with reference to the changes ob-
served. This operation requires us to measure the difference (with respect to the variables
on which public policy wants to intervene) between what happens downstream of the
implementation of the intervention, the factual, and what would have happened if the
intervention had not been made, the counterfactual (Trivellato, 2009). While the first
term of comparison can be observed, the second term is hypothetical, unobservable by
definition, and must therefore be reconstructed in a credible manner.
Hence what has been indicated by Holland (1986) as the fundamental problem of
causal inference, and it is what Heckman et al. (1999) define the fundamental problem of
the evaluation of the effects.
The counterfactual paradigm requires us to reconstruct credibly what would have
been observed on the students exposed to the program in the absence of their having
been exposed. Therefore, each subject has two potential outcomes (Rubin, 1974).
Y Ti , if the individual is exposed to the treatment
Y UTi if the individual is not exposed to the treatment (untreated)
The parameter of interest in observational studies is the average effect of treatment on
10
DEAMS Research Paper 1/2013
those who are treated: the ATT .9 This is the greatness of major interest from the point
of the evaluation of the policies; through its estimate we are able to isolate the causal
effect of the implementation of the policy.
ATT = E(Y T − Y UT | T = 1) = E(Y T | T = 1) E(Y UT | T = 1)
The average effect of treatment on the treated is the average difference between Y T e
Y UT , depending on the treatment.
In this equation the term counterfactual is E(Y UT |T = 1) and indicates how they
would behave if the treated had not been exposed to the treatment.
In the estimation of the ATT it is necessary on the one hand to estimate E(Y T |T = 1),
which is (relatively) trivial since you have a sample of observations of Y T for individuals
treated. On the other hand, it is necessary to estimate E(Y UT |T = 1), i.e. the variable
result in the absence of treatment, which was not observed on the treated individuals .
This, then, will have to be estimated on the basis of the results referring to those who
were untreated.
It is reasonable to assume that the results of the winners of the scholarship do not affect
the results of non-beneficiaries, whereas the intervention being limited in size involves a
small percentage of members. The realization of this condition satisfied the hypothesis
of the absence of interference between individuals, called by Rubin (1980a) Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assignment (SUTVA).
Since this is an observational study, the operation of estimating the counterfactual
term, E(Y UT |T = 1), using the observations on untreated subjects could lead to mistakes
due to selection bias. In order to avoid this, the two groups, the one on which is estimated
E(Y T |T = 1), treated, and that one on which an estimated E(Y UT |T = 1), control group,
must be balanced in all material respects.
The balance prevents distortion if the Conditional Independent Assumption (CIA)
is valid, an assumption which states that, subject to the observable variables X pre-
treatment, the allocation to the program is independent of the potential outcomes.
This implies identifying all the X variables responsible for the selection process and
building the control group subject to the abovementioned variables, thus minimizing the
selection bias. In this way we can go back to the ceteris paribus condition: treated and
controls are equivalent because they are balanced with respect to all explanatory variables
which, in the absence of treatment, affect the outcome variables (Trivellato, 2009).
Implicitly, therefore, it is assumed that at least part of the treated group has, in the
control group, matching individuals. This condition, known in the literature as common
support, must be satisfied, otherwise it is not possible to apply the logic of counterfactual.
When checking the common support between the two groups it is possible to lose some
units treated and this complicates the interpretation of the causal effect, since it doesnt
represent anymore the average effect of treatment on the treated, but a subset of treated
units . It would therefore be more appropriate to define the effect of treatment as Sample
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (Imbens, 2004).
9Average Treatment Effect on the Treated.
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Matching techniques
Assuming that we observe all variables X responsible for the selection bias, a nonpara-
metric method to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect on medium treated with any
treated is to combine an untreated who has the same characteristics, and calculate the
average of the differences between the results observed for the pairs of matched subjects.
More realistically, one compares units which are similar, according to some criteria, with
respect to the X variables.
In the literature there are several matching techniques that allow to compare treated
and untreated and they differ on how similarity in the characteristics X is defined. The
estimated treatment effect may change according to the matching approach which is use;
for this reason, in order to assess the sensitiveness of our results, we performed the analysis
employing different methods: in particular Propensity Score, Genetich Matching based
on Mahalanobis distance and Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) have been considered.
Two common approaches are propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983), in which similarity is measured by the difference in the probability of being treated
(estimated as a logistic regression of the X variables) and multivariate matching, where
assessment of similarity is based on the Mahalanobis distance between units (Cochran
and Rubin, 1973; Rubin, 1980b) (Rubin, 1979). A notable drawback of common match-
ing methods, such as Mahalanobis distance and propensity score matching, is that they
may make balance worse across measured potential counfounders, particularly if the sam-
ple size is small. In applying these methods to our data, this was particularly true for the
propensity score approach; as we have not been able to obtain a satisfying balance across
measured potential counfounders, we discarded this method. Results are given below for
the matching based on Mahalanobis distance changes, the Genetich Matching (Diamond
and Sekhon, 2006; Sekhon, 2008).
This method consists of a matching algorithm able to optimize the balance of the
covariates observed between the treated group and that of the controls. This algorithm
uses a generalization of propensity score and Mahalanobis distance matching in which the
variables are weighted with weights determined (via a genetic algorithm) so as to minimize
the maximum distortion between the control variables. If the Mahalobis distance is not
optimal for attaining balance, the GenMatch algorithm is able to search over the space of
distance metrics and find something better (Sekhon, 2008), including an additional weigh
matrix:
d(Xi, Xj) =
{
(Xi, Xj)
′(S−1/2)′WS−1/2(Xi −Xj)
}1/2
where W is a k x k positive definite weight matrix and S1/2 is the Cholesky decom-
position of S which is the variance-covariance matrix of X.
A second matching technique has been employed: the Coarsened Exact Matching
(Iacus et al., Winter 2012, 2009). The CEM is a balancing tool that operates in a different
manner from the Mahalanobis distance. Through the technique implemented by the CEM
each covariate is temporarily coarsened. The units are then matched if they have the
same values of the coarsened variables. At this point control units within each stratum
are weighed in order to match the number of units processed. The strata in which there
12
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is not at least one treated and one control are effectively pruned from the dataset. The
most important advantage of CEM is that it belongs to the monotonic imbalance bounding
method, as proven in (Iacus et al., 2011).
5. The effects of incentives
The scholarship as a tool to motivate the continuation of the student’s study.
The first analysis proposed relates to the effects of a scholarship awarded on the basis
of income on the probability of enrollment in the second year.
In this context those students who get the scholarship are considered treated, while
the control group consists of those who, despite having the income requirements, do not
receive the scholarship. The reasons why these students were excluded is that either they
did not submit all the required documentation on time, or, more simply, did not apply in
spite of having all the requirements.
Some objections could be made about the construction of the control group, as it
is reasonable to assume that students who have not applied for the scholarship despite
having the requirements are less motivated and/or do not need an economic incentive.
This choice is dictated by the need not to reduce too much the number of individuals in
the group which match the controls: the number of students who do not get the income-
based grant despite having applied for it is limited to such an extent that it would be in
fact impossible to carry out an estimate should the non-applicants be excluded. In this
case the effect of the grant would be overestimated. It must also be considered that the
level of income to which they are assigned is calculated by the Secretariat based on the
Iseeu form voluntarily submitted by the students for the purpose of obtaining reductions
in the payment of tuition fees.
In order to meet the Conditional Independent Assumption and therefore to identify
all the variables X which could affect the outcome variable, it was decided to impose the
exact matching for sex, degree course, the residence in Friuli Venezia Giulia region and
income group. Furthermore, a maximum tolerance level, commonly called Caliper, was
fixed for the high school diploma marks and the age of the students.
The above-mentioned covariates makes the two groups, treated and controls, equiva-
lent in relation to all of the explanatory variables. For examples, the geographical origin
defines the status of a student in the allocation of the scholarship and can also be con-
sidered an indicator of socioeconomic status; matching the students according to their
income bracket means clear differences in their economic conditions; sex was chosen be-
cause it is known that there are gender differences in academic achievement, and finally
the degree course so that students, treated and untreated, belong to the same field of
study chosen and are therefore required to make the same commitment in passing the
exams.
The results obtained with the two matching methods, the genetic matching and the
CEM, listed under table 1, indicate how receiving a scholarship for low-income students
increases their likelihood of enrolling in the second year by 0.18. In the case of CEM,
however, this result is not statistically significant.10
10In Appendix 2 the matching balance is reported, both for genetic matching and CEM.
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Table 1. Probability of enrolling 2nd year for students that receive income-based financial
aid.
Obs. N. Genetic matching CEM
Treated Controls ÂTT Matched ÂTT Treated Controls
observations
99 117 0.18 31 0.18 18 21
s.e. 0.04 (-0.09; 0.46)
Table 2. Probability of enrolling in 2nd year for students that receive merit-based finan-
cial aid.
Obs. N. Genetic matching CEM
Treated Controls ÂTT Matched ÂTT Treated Controls
observations
85 191 0.06 72 0.05 59 74
s.e. 0.03 (-0.02; 0.12)
The second analysis considers the students who won the scholarship allocated solely on
the basis of merit and the possible effects that receiving this economic incentive has on the
probability of enrollment in the second year. In the academic years observed, with respect
to the 777 students registered in the three degree courses, only 280 participated in the
voluntary selection, which is just over 36% of those eligible for it. This results in a process
of self-selection: the participating students differ from the start, for their motivational
characteristics, from those who, despite having the requirements, do not take part in the
selection. It was therefore decided to restrict the survey sample to students registered for
the three degree courses who participated in the selection of the Fonda grant, in order to
have a group of students with the same characteristics as far as motivation is concerned.
As a result, the control group was made up of students who had applied for the Fonda
selection, but who had not passed it, and therefore the useful explanatory variables are the
degree course, sex, residence in the region Friuli Venezia Giulia, high school diploma mark,
age and income group. Furthermore, the exact matching for almost all pre-treatment
variables is required, except for age, high school diploma mark and the income band on
which the Caliper is applied.
The results obtained using both matching techniques are shown in table 2.
In general, the comparison between winners and candidates doesn’t show a statistically
significant effect compared to enrollment in the second year. Both winners and candidates
14
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Table 3. Probability to take the degree in the time alloted for students that receive
income-based financial aid.
Obs. N. Genetic matching CEM
Treated Controls ÂTT Matched ÂTT Treated Controls
observations
99 117 0.09 31 0.02 18 21
s.e. 0.04 (-0.29; 0.34)
who didn’t win seem to have the same motivations in pursuing the course of study chosen;
therefore, winning a scholarship for merit, doesn’t have a significant effect towards the
probability of enrollment in the second year.
The scholarship as an incentive to graduate within the set time frame.
In this section we want to investigate the effect of winning the scholarship on the
probability of concluding the three-year degree within the time frame foreseen by the
academic regulations.11
In the analysis of the effects of the income-based scholarship, the choice was to use in
the matching the X characteristics able to influence the outcome, and the exact matching
was fixed for sex, the degree course, the residence in the Friuli Venezia Giulia region and
income group, while the Caliper was used for age and the high school diploma mark.
As shown in table 3, the effect of receiving an income-based scholarship in obtaining
a degree is not statistically significant; in other words, those who receive the scholarship
are not more likely to graduate within the three years of the course than their colleagues
who, in spite of having the same characteristics, did not receive a financial incentive.
The survey on the impact of the Fonda grant aims at investigating whether the winners
of the scholarship are further encouraged to conclude their studies within the timeframe
foreseen by the university, and so what their probability of graduating is, compared to
their colleagues who do not receive any financial incentive.
The explanatory variables useful for this analysis are the degree course, sex, residence
in Friuli Venezia Giulia, the high school diploma mark, age and income group. The
exact match is required for almost all pre-treatment variables, except for age, high school
diploma grade and income bracket in which we have imposed the Caliper.
The results presented in table 4 show a positive and statistically significant effect
of the scholarship on the probability of graduating within the three years set for those
students receiving financial aid. This conclusion is reinforced by the following analysis,
the assumption of which however differs from the previous one.
It was noted that the score useful to obtain the Fonda grant varies from year to year
11In Italy, university students are not obliged to graduate within a fixed time frame, thus the course
length can vary beyond the recommended length of the course according to the student’s ability or choice.
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Table 4. Probability to take the degree in the time alloted for students that receive
merit-based financial aid.
Obs. N. Genetic matching CEM
Treated Controls ÂTT Matched ÂTT Treated Controls
observations
85 191 0.24 72 0.21 59 74
s.e. 0.07 (-0.06; 0.36)
Table 5. Probability to take the degree in the time alloted for students that receive
merit-based financial aid matched solely on the scores
Obs. N. ÂTT
Treated Controls 0.30 Matched observations
65 56 s.e. 0.12 26
because both the number of grants payable and the score required change12 and therefore
the same score, for example 80, in one academic year provides a scholarship, while in the
next academic year it might be not sufficient to attract a grant.
It seems therefore legitimate to consider those students who got the same score in
different years, even though some of whom get the grant and others don’t, as casually
treated or as a control group, as the threshold for the disbursement of the scholarship is
independent of anything else.
It was decided, therefore, to combine students solely on the basis of the score ob-
tained in the final selection, thus simulating an experimental design in which the group
assignment of the treated (winners) and that of controls (suitable) occurs randomly.
The results shown in table 5 show a statistically significant effect on the probability
of completing their education due to the merit economic incentive.
12All those who obtain a minimum score in the written exam of 70/100, required to get the grant are
considered suitable. During the subsequent oral selection a merit rank is established, and it varies from
year to year.
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6. Conclusions
The objective of this study is, generally speaking, the analysis of the effectiveness of
financial incentives to reinforce a desired behavior, which in this specific case is in terms
of persistence and graduation within the timeframe set by the course of study against
financial incentives tied to income limits or to “open” ones, related to merit only.
The group of students surveyed enrolled in degree courses in chemistry, physics and
mathematics at the University of Trieste from the academic year 2002/2003 to academic
year 2007/2008.
With regard to this group of students, the effects of two forms of incentives, the
one based on income (scholarships provided by the Regional Agency for the Right to
Education) and the other provided exclusively to deserving students, regardless of their
income, by the College of Sciences “Luciano Fonda” were evaluated.
Graduates in the relevant disciplines are deemed strategic to build a “knowledge-
based economy more competitive and dynamic, capable of creating a sustainable economic
growth with more and better jobs.”13 These subject areas are considered to be among those
able to boost research allowing our country to regain competitiveness, but even before
starting university, and possibly getting a job in the research, the Italian students face
serious weaknesses in these areas. In this case it is difficult to deny the connection: post
hoc ergo propter hoc.
In the case presented here, it is reasonable to suggest that the students considered in
the evaluation do not suffer the problems raised by Heckman about the lack of human
capital for social and family reasons, as both the OECD-PISA analysis14, and the investi-
gation INVALSI15 placed the students from the Friuli Venezia Giulia region significantly
above not only the Italian average, but also the OECD average.
The high school diploma held by those registered in the three university courses con-
sidered is primarily from school which have a scientific (55% of the sample) and industrial
technical (15%) leaning. As far as the distribution of the diploma marks is concerned
(see figure 2), it is to be noted that those with top marks enrolled in the physics degree
course,16 thus there is a important effect of self-selection.
The results of the estimates of the model we propose using the Genetic matching and
Coarsened Exact matching reveal that:
• The grants allocated for reasons of income increased by 0.1817 the probability of
enrollment in the second year of the beneficiary students. The financial incentive,
therefore, is useful in countering the dropout from university and encourage stu-
dents to continue their academic career. On the contrary, there is no statistically
significant effect on the probability of the scholarship recipients to graduate within
the timeframe set by their curricula.
Consequently, the income related grant acts as an incentive against dropout. It can
be assumed that in the absence of the grant, some of the beneficiaries would not
13Footnote European Council, Lisbon, 2000.
14Program for International Student Assessment
15National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education and Training 2006 and 2009
16The majority of these students had a mark between 95 and 100 out of a 100.
17The change is expressed in absolute terms on the scale 0− 1.
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have continued their studies.
• The scholarships awarded because of merit do not show a statistically significant
effect on the probability of enrollment in the second year. In this context, therefore,
it does not play any role in encouraging the continuation of studies. The causal effect
of receiving the scholarship is evident in relation to graduation: the probability that
students who received the financial incentive have to graduate in three years exceeds
0.21 (CEM) and 0.24 (Genetic matching) that of their peers. These results are
reinforced by further analysis where the winners are compared to non-beneficiaries
who have the same initial requirements of merit. In this case the probability of the
winning students to graduate within 3 academic years is even 0.3 higher than those
who were excluded.
The causal effect of the scholarship for merit, then, is to encourage the completion
of studies exactly within the timeframe set by academic regulations.
In the light of these estimates the following line of reasoning can be followed: the
public resources supporting the student’s income do not appear to be such as to motivate
the students to graduate within the timeframe foreseen by the academic regulations, while
they rather appear to be a great help to not dropout; a partial support of this thesis is
found can be found in Mealli and Rampichini (2006).
However, the assessment of the effectiveness of this educational policy can only be
questionable, since the current distribution of resources does not seem useful to reach the
final goal.
Pursuing excellence, however, stimulates the quick completion of studies and is a
clear signal (Spence, 1973) of productivity useful for inclusion in the labor market. The
assessment of the efficiency of the incentive that rewards merit seems to be positive, both
as a result inside the educational system as well as an external indicator.18
This assumption is justified by the analysis presented, the research sample of which
does not show dishomogeneity in initial conditions, or in terms of socioeconomic back-
ground, nor with respect to the basic preparation. The use of merit based incentives,
then, seems to be the most effective tool.
APPENDIX A
Descriptive statistics
18The education system turns out to be efficient both in relation to the results obtained by the students
and for the best chances of employment.
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Fig. 1. Enrolled students by gender and course degree. Black=male; red=female. (Data
Source: University of Trieste)
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Table 6. Pre and post-matching balance statistics for variable Physics
Before matching After matching
Mean treatment 0.64706 0.70833
Mean control 0.6911 0.70833
Std mean diff -9.1614 0
Table 7. Pre and post-matching balance statistics for variable Chemistry
Before matching After matching
Mean treatment 0.18824 0.13889
Mean control 0.1623 0.13889
Std mean diff 6.5947 0
APPENDIX B
Goodness of matching
a. Goodness of matching
1) Genetic matching balance
The measure of imbalance - the degree to which the multivariate empirical density of
the treated units differs from the multivariate empirical density of the control units - is
the absolute difference in means between each of the pre-treatment variables.
In the tables 6 to 13 there are two columns for each variable. The first column contains
the pre-matching balance statistics and the second one the post-matching statistics.
A different measure, the QQ plots (see figure 4), is reported for better capture differ-
ence in features of the distribution of high school mark.
Table 8. Pre and post-matching balance statistics for variable Mathematics
Before matching After matching
Mean treatment 0.16471 0.15278
Mean control 0.1466 0.15278
Std mean diff 4.8535 0
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Table 9. Pre and post-matching balance statistics for variable Sex male
Before matching After matching
Mean treatment 0.77647 0.77778
Mean control 0.65969 0.77778
Std mean diff 27.867 0
Table 10. Pre and post-matching balance statistics for variable FVG region residence
Before matching After matching
Mean treatment 0.74118 0.79167
Mean control 0.7644 0.79167
Std mean diff -5.2706 0
Table 11. Pre and post-matching balance statistics for variable High School Mark
Before matching After matching
Mean treatment 96.176 95.514
Mean control 89.948 95.403
Std mean diff 82.552 1.4867
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Fig. 4. Empirical-QQ Plot of High School Mark
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Table 12. Pre and post-matching balance statistics for variable Age
Before matching After matching
Mean treatment 19.082 19.014
Mean control 19.461 19.014
Std mean diff -107.41 0
Table 13. Pre and post-matching balance statistics for variable Income bracket
Before matching After matching
Mean treatment 7.1529 7.2639
Mean control 6.7696 7.2639
Std mean diff 17.998 0
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Table 14. CEM imbalance measure
Statistics Type L1
Degree course 2.338010e+00 Chi2 5.551115e-17
Sex 1.631293e+00 Chi2 0.000000e+00
FVG residence diff 0.000000e+00 diff 0.000000e+00
High school marks -6.779661e-02 diff 0.000000e+00
Age -1.683764e-02 diff 0.000000e+00
Income bracket -8881784e-16 diff 0.000000e+00
2) CEM imbalance measure.
The measure employed by CEM is L1 imbalance metric, which is the average of the
absolute differences in the frequencies of the populated cells of the multivariate histogram
of the treated group and the multivariate histogram of the control group (Iacus et al.,
2011).
A value of L1 = 0 indicates identical treatment and control distribution, and L1 = 1
indicates complete imbalance and no overlap between the densities (see table 14).
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